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OF CHINESE WALLS, BATTERING RAMS, AND
BUILDING PERMITS: FIVE LESSONS ABOUT
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW FROM SINO-U.S.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT RELATIONS
JACQUES DELISLE*
In one of his more accurate predictions, Karl Marx wrote that
international trade would batter down Chinese walls - that a
dynamic global capitalism would bring China and other economi-
cally less-developed nations firmly into its orbit, on its own
terms.' Although broadly prescient, Marx's assessment - and a
good number of non-Marxist analyses - failed to foresee the
protracted and uneven path of international economic integration,
and the significant role that international economic law would
play in the process.2 International economic law's prominent
* Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Portions of
this essay are based on a presentation at the Salzburg Seminar Session on
"United States Foreign Policy in Asia: Adapting to Change" (Salzburg, Austria,
1995). The author's participation in the seminar was made possible by a
Presidential Fellowship from the University of Pennsylvania.
1 The idea runs through much of Marx's writings on colonialism and the
territorial expansion of capitalism. The pithiest statement for present purposes
is the following:
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of
production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication,
draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civili[z]ation. The
cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it
batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians'
intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all
nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of
production ....
Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in THE
MARX-ENGELS READER 469, 477 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978).
2 In Marx's case, the failure to appreciate these phenomena took the
specific forms of assumptions that the integration of non-Western areas into a
global economic system, ultimately of a capitalist form, would occur without
reversal and with only a passive role for the developing areas, and of a
conspicuous lack of significant discussion, even of a critica sort, of law as a
part of the colonial impact. See, e.g., Karl Marx, The German Ideology: Part I,
in THE MARX-ENGELS READER, supra note 1, at 146, 185-86; Karl Marx, The
Future Results of British Rule in India, in The Marx-Engels Reader, supra note
1, at 659, 659-64; see also ANTHONY BREWER, MARXIST THEORIES OF
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place in international relations, in transnational business ties, and
in domestic law and politics can no longer be gainsaid. Yet, its
diversity and dynamism - and its fragility - warn us that we
have only begun the task of examining that which lies within the
field's sprawling and unstable boundaries.
This journal provides a welcome and promising forum for
exploring those issues - a role that the journal had already begun
to undertake admirably during its previous incarnation.3 This
IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL SURVEY (1980) (describing the debate among later
Marxists over whether integration of the less developed world into a world-
wide capitalist economy had an ultimately progressive - as Marx generally
thought - or a destructive dependency-creating impact on "backward" areas).
Non-Marxist perspectives of a broadly liberal persuasion often evince a
belief in a similarly certain and irreversible path (albeit to a very different, and
certainly not reliably socialist, destination). See, eg., Francis Fukuyama, The
End of History?, NAT'L INTEREST, Summer 1989, at 3 (arguing that post-Cold
War global triumph of liberal democratic values marked the end of world
historical development); cf. ROBERT PACKENHAM, LIBERAL AMERICA AND THE
THIRD WORLD 123-30 (1973) (describing the U.S. conviction in the 1950s and
1960s that U.S. aid and influence would foster economic development, social
stability and democratic politics in recipient nations). More subtle analyses
under the banners of "neo-institutionalism" or "neo-liberalism" - and even
"neo-realism" - in the international relations literature are much closer to the
mark, but they still pay strikingly little attention to law - and particularly
international economic law - as a significant and distinctive category. See
generally ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND
DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); NEO-REALISM AND ITS
CRITICS (Robert 0. Keohane ed., 1986); NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM:
THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE (David A. Baldwin ed., 1993); see also Stephan
Haggard & Beth A. Simmons, Theories of International Regimes, in 41 INT'L
ORG. 491, 491-92 (1987) (contrasting the perspective of political science
international relations theory, even of the neo-institutional- type, with the
traditional perspectives of international law). But see Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic Law: Liberal International
Relations Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 717, 724 (1995) (finding close connections between focus of regime
theorists in international relations and questions of international law, especially
international economic law).
3 See, e.g., Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade
Organization Disputes to Nongovernmental Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
295 (1996). Among the many earlier articles that are in the same vein and
spirit, a few of those that most closely reflect the themes discussed in this essay
include: Mark A. Behrens & Daniel H. Raddock, Japan's New Product Liabilit
Law: The Citadel of Strict Liability Falls, but Access to Recovery is Limited by
Formidable Barriers, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus L. 669 (1995); Harold Dichter,
Legal Implications ofan Asia-Pacific Economic Grouping, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus.
L. 99 (1995); Charles W. Mooney, Jr. & Atsushi Kinami, Transfer, Pledge,
Clearance and Settlement in the Japanese and United States Government Securities
Markets, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 517 (1991); Barbara Campbell Potter,
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essay offers some thoughts on the contours of an ascendant
international economic law and the quandaries posed by its
on-going transformation. The contemporary encounter between
the People's Republic of China ("China" or "P.R.C.") and the
United States - between a country that until recently was the
most insular of the great powers, boasting one of the world's
largest, fastest-growing and most rapidly opening economies, on
the one hand, and the nation with the world's largest economy
and the largest shares of international trade and investment, on
the other - provides some of the most dramatic instances, and
constitutes some of the most important pieces, of more general
patterns. The Sino-U.S. case thus teaches, and illustrates, five
lessons about the importance, scope, and character of contempo-
rary international economic law.
The first lesson is the most obvious: the potential domain of
international economic law has become, in the closing decades of
this century, both unprecedentedly vast and extraordinarily central
to international relations. The range and scale of activities that
international economic law, including individual nations' foreign
economic laws, might govern has burgeoned in recent years and
will continue to do so. As business across borders has boomed,
the economic component in international affairs has expanded
sharply, largely at the expense of ideological and security con-
cerns. Those who ignore the potential demand for, and the
prospective domain of, international economic law thus risk
missing a great, and ever greater, portion of what matters.
Perhaps nowhere has this happened more clearly than in the
relationship between the P.R.C. and the United States. China's
trading relationship with the United States has grown from near-
zero levels before 1979 to $40 billion or more in the mid-1990s.
Overall, imports and exports have soared to comprise, by some
estimates, well over one-third of China's rapidly growing gross
China's Equity Joint Venture Law: A Standing Invitation to the West for Foreign
Investment?, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 1 (1993); Richard A. Westin, Interna-
tional Equity and Third World Mining, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 181 (1992).
As these titles suggest, the "international" law covered by the journal had
already come to include, as it had for several of the other leading international
law journals, those aspects of "comparative law" - that is, foreign "domestic"
or "municipal" law - that are relevant to individuals, firms and-governments
outside the nation issuing those laws. Also, the term "business" clearly had
been extended to include much that lay beyond any narrow construction of the
term that took in only private, commercial law.
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national product during the last few years. The U.S. share in this
trade is substantial, with the United States accounting for around
one-fifth of China's foreign trade and, according to some official
statements, up to two-fifths of the global market for China's
exports.4 On the U.S. side, the new China trade accounts for a
much smaller portion of U.S. imports and exports. Nonetheless,
Chinese products have captured a major share in some significant
U.S. markets (notably toys and apparel), while the Chinese market
is becoming vital to export growth for several key U.S. industries.
In addition, a persistent Chinese trade surplus has been a signifi-
cant contributor to the U.S.'s overall trade deficit.5
Developments in U.S. investment in China tell a similar tale.
Starting from a baseline of virtually no foreign investment in the
late 1970s, China was attracting eighty to 100 billion dollars
annually in contracted investment and $25 billion or more per
year in actual investment by the middle 1990s. China has thus
become one of the world's top recipients of foreign direct
investment, rivaling and in some years surpassing the United
States. The United States ranks as one of China's top five sources
for this growing investment - higher if the special cases of Hong
4 Disparities between U.S. and P.R.C. figures, questions of the appropriate
conversion rate between renminbi and dollars, disagreements about how to
classify trade via Hong Kong, and persisting shortcomings in China's system
for collecting statistics make precise and accurate measurements of several of the
relationships referred to here nearly impossible. The data relied upon here has
been culled from Foreign Ministry Interview on U.S. Trade, GA T, BRITISH
BROADCASTING CORP., Summary of World Broadcasts [hereinafter BBC-SWB],
Mar. 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, China File; CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE, China's Economy
in 1994 and 1995: Overheating Pressures Recede, Tough Choices Remain 23
(December 1995); Statistical Bureau Communique on China's Economic Develop-
ment in 1994, BBC-SWB, Mar. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
China File [hereinafter Statistical Bureau Communique]; Simon Holberton,
Beijing Protests over U.S. Claims of $30 Billion Trade Deficit, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
9, 1995, at 3 (quoting Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Lee Sands on U.S.
share of China's exports); 1995 Foreign Trade Up 18 Percent, XINHuA NEWS
AGENCY, Jan. 21, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, China File.
5 See, e.g., Nai-Ruenn Chen, U.S.-Cbina Commercial Relations: A Decade
After Normalization, in CHINA'S ECONOMIC DILEMMAS IN THE 1990S 895, 898-
905 (U.S. Cong., Jt. Econ. Comm. ed., 1991); Patrick E. Tyler, Awe-Struck U.S.
Executives Survey the China Market, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1994, at D1 (discussing
possible roles for U.S. firms in meeting China's vast demand for power plants
and other infrastructure projects).
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Kong and Macao are excluded.6 Once largely confined to four
special economic zones on China's southeastern coast, the areas in
which U.S. and other foreign investment is encouraged grew to
include major coastal cities in the middle 1980s and, later, the
country as a whole, including economically-backward areas.'
6 Data on these issues are reported in Foreign Investment in China on the
Rise, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, July 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, China File; Statistical Bureau Communique, supra note 4; China
Attracted $34 Billion in Investment in 1994, REUTERs, Jan. 26, 1995, available
in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, China File; Nicholas R. Lardy, The Role of Foreign
Trade and Investment in China's Economic Transformation, 144 CHINA Q. 1065,
1065-67 (1995); Changes Reported in Foreign Investment Structure, BBC-SWB,
May 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, China File; YOICHI
FUNABASHI ET AL., AN EMERGING CHINA IN A WORLD OF INTERDEPEN-
DENCE 37 (1994).
' This course of development is reflected in the sequence and subject matter
of several key reform-era laws. See, e.g.,. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Guangdongsheng Jingji Tequ Tiaoli [Regulations of the P.R.C. on the Special
Economic Zones in Guangdong Province] (1980 regulations providing for
special, favorable regime for foreign investment in the three SEZs located in
Guangdong province ; Dalian Jingji Jishu Kaifaqu Shewai Jingji Hetong Guanli
Banfa [Measures of the Dalian Economic and Technological Open Development
Zone for the Administration of Economic Contracts with Foreigners] (1984
regulations governing foreign investment and trade relations for one of the
coastal cities-then declared "open" to greater foreign investment and authorized
to establish special, favorable legal regimes for foreign investment); Tianjin
Jingji Jishu Kaifaqu Guanli Tiaoli [Regulations for the Administration of the
Tianjin Economic and Technological Open Development Zone] (similar but
more general 1985 regulations for another of the open coastal cities); Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Shewai Jinsji Hetong Fa [Foreign Economic Contract Law
of the P.R.C.] [hereinafter Foreign Economic Contract Law] (1985 framework
statute for foreign economic contracts, including some investment contracts,
throughout China); see also China Laws for Foreign Business - Business
Regulation (CH Australia) and China Laws for Foreign Business - Special
Zones & Cities (CCH Australia) (translating these and most of the other
Chinese laws and regulations cited in this essay ; Rowena Tsang, Beiing to Lure
Investors Inland, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 21, 1995, at 4 (describing
1994 Provisional Regulations on Directing the Orientation of Foreign
Investment as "aimed specifically at encouraging foreign manufacturers to
invest" in remote parts of central and western China). While a general national
law on Sino-foreign equity joint-ventures dates to 1979, such ventures outside
the SEZs were modest compared to the boom in SEZ-based foreign investment,
and the law itself was quite sparse until it was supplemented with extensive
regulations in 1984. See HARRY HARDING, CHINA S SECOND REVOLUTION:
REFORM AFTER MAO 159-70 (1987) (describing expansion of areas in which
foreign investment welcome and of areas with special legal regimes designed to
attract foreign investment). The pattern of investment appears to have
responded to some degree to the regulatory changes. See China: Foreign Fund
Use Will Hit $150 Billion, CHINA DAILY, July 25, 1995, at 1 (stating that
Guangdong and Fujian, the coastal provinces home to the initial SEZs,
1996]
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Once concentrated in tourism and natural resource exploitation
and confined to a handful of projects in several other sectors,
foreign-invested enterprises were welcomed, or at least tolerated,
in almost every major industry and a significant range of services
by the middle 1990s.8 Chinese investments have begun to flow
abroad, including to the United States, with total foreign invest-
ment by P.R.C. entities now surpassing $5 billion.9
At the same time, the political and strategic concerns that so
dominated the U.S.-China relationship, and international relations
more generally, have to a significant degree ceded the field to
economic affairs. The United States and China had regarded one
another, in the 1950s and 1960s, as parts of an intractable and
monolithic enemy block to be confronted aggressively in politics
and shunned completely in commerce, and, in the 1970s, as
another point of a strategic triangle with whom limited security
cooperation was desirable and very limited economic entangle-
ments were tolerable. The focus and tone of the relationship
changed dramatically with the advent of Post-Mao economic
reforms in China and the end of the Cold War internationally.
A brief catalogue of the major U.S.-China news stories of recent
years reflects the shift. Territorial disputes involving Taiwan and
the Spratly Islands and concerns with Chinese exports of military
technology point to continuing and volatile strategic tensions, and
human rights issues have become an important political factor.
Nonetheless, economic and commercial issues now dominate,
including: concerns about the bilateral trade imbalance; questions
of China's continued enjoyment of Most-Favored Nation ("MFN")
status and the prospects for its entry into the General Agreement
accounted for nearly 70% of foreign-invested projects in 1985 but less than 30%
in 1994).
8 See generally MARGARET M. PEARSON, JOINT VENTURES IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 116-20 (1991); Pitman B. Potter, Foreign Invest-
ment Law in the People's Republic of China: Dilemmas of State Control, 141
CHINA Q. 155, 162, 166-67 (1995); Preston M. Torbert, New Foreign Investment
Regulations Clarify China's Priorities; Existing and Approved Investments Should
Not Be Affected, E. ASIAN ExECUTIvE REP., July 15, 1995, at 7; Foreign
Investment: Construction Industry to Open Wider to Foreign Investment, BBC-
SWB, Nov. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, China File.
" See China's Businesses Investing More Abroad, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY,
Aug. 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, China File; China Increases
Overseas Investment, XjNHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 26,
1990, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, China File.
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on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and the World Trade Organiza-
tion ("WTO"); threats of trade sanctions in retaliation for China's
failure to do more to protect U.S.-owned intellectual property;
and visits by highly-visible Chinese delegations to the United
States and U.S. missions to China to secure Chinese purchases of
U.S. products.1 °
These changes in Sino-U.S. ties are but one striking case of a
worldwide shift toward openness in what had been more closed
and dirigiste systems common in the developing world and in
socialist states from Southeast Asia to the heart of Europe. The
heavy artillery of international economic integration has indeed
battered down Chinese walls. The battering rams, however, have
been wielded by both sides, have included sophisticated invest-
ment devices as well as conventional trade, and have accompanied
a decline, both relative and absolute, in the political commitment
to maintaining the walls. Not least, their work has opened up a
vast space for the construction of an international economic law
suited to a new era of openness and integration.
The second lesson suggests a partial answer to a question left
unresolved by the first lesson: international economic law has
developed dramatically to occupy much of its expanded potential
domain, and to provide a framework for a staggering volume and
bewildering array of cross-border business arrangements. To be
sure, cause and effect are difficult to disentangle. As international
trade and investment have grown rapidly through the kinds of
decentralized, autonomous decisions by individual enterprises and
investors that were, until recently, subject to extensive state
planning, discretionary administrative controls, or simple
exclusion in much of the world, there have been few conceivable
responses other than a turn to law to facilitate such dealings. On
the other hand, this proliferation and diversification of economic
activity depended on some substantial prior construction of a
suitable legal infrastructure. Whatever the sequence of develop-
ment, the resulting pattern is clear: a richer and more expansive
realm of international economic law, including individual
10 For overviews of these issues, see Jonathan D. Pollack, The United States
and Asia in 1995: The Case of the Missing President, 36 ASIAN SURV. 1, 3-7
(1996); John B. Starr, China in 1995: Mounting Problems, Waning Capacity, 36
ASIAN SURv. 13, 22-23 (1996); Richard P. Cronin, The United States and Asia
in 1994, 35 ASIAN SuRv. 111, 112-15 (1995); see also discussion infra notes 29,
34, and accompanying text.
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countries' foreign economic laws, that structures expanded
transnational economic activity.
Again, U.S. investment in, and trade with, the P.R.C. provide
some striking examples. Some of the major private ventures of
the early reform era in China seemed no less dependent on elite
political leaders' preferences and interests than were the fates of
major domestic state enterprises and the broader economic sectors
that they dominated." Additionally, a substantial portion of
foreign funds initially flowed through huge projects of a public
character, whether government-to-government or multilateral.
12
The spectacular expansion of U.S. and other foreign investment
in recent years, by contrast, has made use of a variety of increas-
ingly sophisticated and varied vehicles offered by a rapidly
growing legal structure for private investment from abroad. Even
a partial catalogue of major legislation gives some flavor of the
pace and direction of change: a law on Sino-foreign equity joint-
ventures in 1979, a general law on Sino-foreign economic contracts
(including trade contracts) in 1985, a law on wholly foreign-owned
n See, e.g., JIM MANN, BEIJING JEEP: THE SHORT, UNHAPPY ROMANCE
OF AMERICAN BUSINESS IN CHINA (1989); Pearson, supra note 8, at 74, 137-38.
For an account of the mechanisms for, and exercise of, control over production
enterprises by government organs and the Communist Party, and of the
interventions of political elites in the "pre-reform" system, see generally JANOS
KORNAI, THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMU-
NISM (1992); Richard M. Pfeffer, The Institution of Contracts in the Chinese
People's Republic; Part I, 14 CHINA Q. 153 (1963); ALEXANDER ECKSTEIN,
CHINA'S ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 31-65, 120-58 (1977) (discussing impact of
politics and elite policy choices on economic sectors); KENNETH LIEBERTHAL
& MICHEL OKSENBERG, POLICY MAKING IN CHINA: LEADERS, STRUCTURES
AND PROCESSES 58-62 (1988) (discussing the impact of elite factionalism on
energy sector).
2 Compare A. DOAK BARNETT, CHINA'S ECONOMY IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE 237 (1981) (discussing major flow of World Bank funds that
would follow China's entry into the organization) and William Feeney, Chinese
Policy in Multilateral Financial Institutions, in CHINA AND THE WORLD:
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-MAO ERA 266, 270-82 (Samuel S. Kim
ed., 1984) (describing World Bank, International Development Association and
United Nations Development projects for infrastructure and technology
development in China in early 1980's) with Audrey R. Topping, Ecological
Roulette: Damming the Yangtze, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 132, 14445
(describing the controversy surrounding, and the reluctance of foreign public
and multilateral lenders to become involved with, the most significant public
works project of the current period).
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enterprises in 1986, and a foreign trade law in 1994."3 More
recent developments in the laws governing corporations and
securities have provided legal means for foreigners to engage in
greater "passive" or "portfolio" investment in domestic Chinese
enterprises.1
4
The U.S.-China case, especially with respect to trade relations,
also provides some dramatic instances of pressures for growth in
more conventionally "international" economic law as well.
Throughout much of the Post-Mao era, China has been seeking to
join the GATT. The extension of membership to China, and
China's movement toward conformity with international norms
and rules that its accession would require, 5 would bring a
sudden and dramatic increase in the reach of the international
legal order embodied in GATT. Moreover, the recent expansion
of the principal global trade regime to encompass new economic
sectors and to provide major new institutional infrastructure
under the WTO has made the question of Chinese membership
all the more significant. The sharpness of the controversy -
fueled by U.S. objections to China's non-conforming practices,
U.S. concerns about the consequences of extending developing
country concessions to such a major trading country, and China's
reactions to the U.S.'s positions16 - is eloquent testimony to the
13 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Fa
[Law of the P.R.C. on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures] [hereinafter Equity
Joint Venture Law]; Foreign Economic Contract Law, supra note 7; Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Waizi Qiye Fa [Law of the P.R.C. Concerning (Wholly)
Foreign-Owned Enterprises]; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Duiwai Maoyi Fa
[Foreign Trade Law of the P.R.C.].
14 For analyses of some of the most significant legal and regulatory changes
in this area, see Preston M. Torbert, China's New Company Law: Foreign
Investment Issues, E. ASIAN ExEcUTIVE REP., Aug. 15, 1994, at 7; Yang Zhang,
MOFTEC Regulations Create New Investment Vehicle: Advantages of Foreign
Invested Companies Limited by Shares, Consequences of Conversions for FIEs, E.
ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Apr. 15, 1995, at 9.
15 For an overview of these issues, see Donald C. Clarke, GATTMember-
ship for China?, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 517 (1994).
16 See James V. Feinerman, A New World Order, World Trade Organization,
CHINA Bus. REV., Mar. 1995, at 16 (overview of WTO elements relevant to
China trade); Anne Phelan, China: Uncertain Prospects for WTO, E. ASIAN
EXECUTIVE REP., Dec. 15, 1995, at 4 (discussing changes U.S. demands from
China as prerequisite to U.S. support for China's entry into WTO); Li Accuses
U.S. on WTO, Warns May Favor Other Traders, REUTERS, Apr. 12, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, China File (quoting Chinese Premier Li
Peng as stating, "The United States demands that China fulfill the conditions
1996]
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perceived importance of matters affecting the scope and content
of this major component of contemporary international economic
law.
The third lesson concerns not the scope and scale of interna-
tional economic law, but the complexity and ambivalence of its
content: contemporary international economic law - especially
that portion comprised of nations' foreign economic laws - is as
much regulatory as it is facilitative. This field of law can be, and
is, a tool for controlling and placing conditions on international
trade and foreign investment as well as a means of encouraging
such activity. To the extent that the term "international business
law" evokes only the latter function, it may well be a blow for
accuracy to abandon that term in favor of "international economic
law," with its likely connotations of a broader field that includes
public law and regulation.
Here too, developments in the legal structures for business
dealings between China and the United States fit, and help to
define, a broader pattern. On one hand, removing impediments
and providing an infrastructure of rules conducive to
market-regarding and contract-governed economic relationships
has been a primary imperative in China's reforms. In a trend
echoed throughout the developing and post-socialist world, most
of China's recent foreign economic legislation contains, by design,
much that U.S. and other foreign businesses find relatively
familiar and fairly comfortable. Some key laws provide that
Chinese enterprises, including state-owned ones, are "legal
persons" with capacity to make their own contracts and manage-
ment decisions, and that their civil liabilities should be satisfied
with property that they own or that is properly entrusted to
for developed nations. We cannot accept this . . . ."); Seth Faison, U.S. and
China Sign Accord to End Piracy of Software, Music Recordings and Film, N.Y.
TimEs, Feb. 27, 1995, at Al (discussing possible link between intellectual
property protection accord and removal of U.S. opposition to China's WTO
membership); China Says WITO Entry Demands Unfair, Unacceptable, Reuters,
Mar. 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, China File (quoting Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesman statement that "exorbitant demands" exceeding
"the [evel of development of China" made by "some major parties to the
WTO" constituted "the main obstacle" to China's membership, noting that
official Chinese press reports accused the U.S. of a strategy of containment"
against China, and listing greater access to Chinese markets and China's
admission as a developed -- and not a developing - nation as among terms
U.S. demanded as condition for accepting China's bid to join the WTO).
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them. Other laws assure that Chinese enterprises' autonomy in
making a considerable range of business decisions is protected
from arbitrary government interference. Still other laws promise
access to courts, and permit international arbitration, to address
disputes about performance or validity of international commer-
cial contracts.17  On the U.S. side, repeated renewals of China's
MFN trading privileges and the dismantling of a variety of Cold
War-era restrictions, especially with respect to technology transfer,
reflect moves in the same direction, although of lesser magnitude
and from a less-restrictive baseline.'
On the other hand, China's newly foreigner-friendly and
market-oriented legal regime for trade and investment remains
highly regulatory and preserves a substantial sphere for state
control and discretion. A few examples suggest a formidable array
of administrative levers that are, in general character if not in
detail, hardly unique to Chinese law. Foreign trade and invest-
ment contracts still depend, directly or indirectly, on approval by
various governmental gate-keepers, and can be deemed void where
they conflict with China's "public interest." U.S. traders' and
17 See, e.g., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze [General
Principles of Civil Law of the P.R.C.] art. 36 (defining legal persoh); Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Quanmin Suoyouzhi Gongye Qiye Fa [Law of the P.R.C.
on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People] art. 2 [hereinafter State-
Owned Enterprise Law] (describing enterprises' general powers, including
"autonomy in management" [zizhu ]ingying] an4 dbearing civil liability"
[chengdan minshi zeren] with state property under enterprises' management); c
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa [Company Law of the P.R.C.] arts.
3, 13 [hereinafter Company Law] (similar); see also State-Owned Enterprise Law
art. 33 (enterprise right to resist administrative organ demands that enterprise
"share out" or permit reallocation of [tanpa] resources); 
Foreign Economic
Contract Law, supra note 7, arts. 37, 38 (arbitration agreements permitted;
access to people s courts for adjudication of disputes provided, absent
arbitration agreement); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongcai Fa [Arbi-
tration Law of the P.R.C.] arts. 65-73; Zhongguo Guoji Jingji Maoyi Zhongcai
Weiyuanhui Zhongcai Guize [Arbitration Rules of the China International
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission]. See generally Jacques L. deLisle,
Foreign Investment: The Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People s Republic
of China, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 275, 280-83 (1986).
iS See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, U.S. Ending Curbs on High-Tech Gear to
Cold War Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1994, at Al (describing the Clinton
administration decision to reduce significantly restrictions on exports of high
technology goods to China, in the wake of Western nations decision to
terminate the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls, an
institution established in 1949 to maintain strict limits on technology transfers
to Communist countries); see also infra note 35.
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investors' major prospective Chinese partners are legally restricted
to the range activities - including foreign trade and investment
activities - specified in government-issued business licenses that
typically authorize much less than the all-purpose charters of U.S.
corporations. State-owned enterprises - which still loom large in
the segments of the Chinese economy most relevant to U.S.
traders and investors - operate under the watchful eye and long
shadow of government "departments in charge," bureaucratic
licensing and inspection authorities, and, ultimately, the power of
the state to exercise its ownership rights in pursuit of non-market-
regarding political ends. Foreigners' opportunities to purchase
shares in Chinese companies also remain limited, and their rights
as shareholders ambiguous. 9 On the U.S. side of the relation-
ship, China - still at least nominally communist and with a
checkered human rights record - is subject to a variety of statutes
that authorize restrictions on trade and investment tighter than
the sometimes-considerable limitations that U.S. laws otherwise
impose on U.S. trade and investment partners and the U.S.
citizens who do business with them.2
19 See, e.g, Equity Joint Venture Law, supra note 13, art. 3 (government
approval requirement); Foreign Economic Contract Law, supra note 7, art. 9
(contracts violating the public interest are void); State-Owned Enterprise Law,
supra note 17, arts. 16, 55 (licensing requirements, inspection and supervision
role of government organs, restriction of enterprise's business to specifically
authorized scope); Company Law, supra note 17, arts. 27, 67, 77, 94-96, 124-28
(similar); Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises
and the Emerging Securities Regulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN
L.J. 62, 89-91 (1993) (describing still-modest sales of "B" shares to foreigners, a
class separate from the "A" shares sold to domestic investors); cf. Robert C. Art
& Mingkang Gu, China Incorporated: The First Corporation Law of the People's
Republic of China, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 273, 301 (1995) (noting Company Law's
curious failure to address whether and how "B" shareholders' rig ts will be
protected). See generally Potter, supra note 8, at 167-74 (describing various state
mechanisms designed to manage and control foreign investment); Xiangmin Xu
& Celina Chew, Foreign Investment Enterprises in China: A Comprehensive
Guide to Approval Issues, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Nov. 15, 1995, at 9.
2 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1995) (denying MFN status, investment
guarantees, and commercial agreements to "nonmarket economy countries" that
deny or financially burden emigration); 12 U.S.C. S 635(b)(2) (1995) (prohibit-
ing Export-Import Bank credits for trade with China and other countries with
"Marxist-Leninist" planned economies, subject to waiver on basis of presidential
determination that credits would be in the national interest); 22 U.S.C.
§ 2191a(a)(4), 2199(f), 2199(i), 2200a (1996) (special investigative requirements
and restrictions on Overseas Private Investment Corporation extension of
guarantees, insurance, or finance for programs for China or countries with poor
human rights records).
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A fourth lesson addresses a different kind of complexity in
contemporary international economic law, one that involves not
ambivalence of content but, rather, ambiguity of actors: interna-
tional economic law is made and administered by an increasingly
heterogeneous and intricately overlapping group of participants,
interacting in ever more varied arenas. Where nation-states,
private corporations, and the occasional global organization once
held sway, the field is now shared with sub-national governments,
supra-national regional organizations, new species of state
corporations, and more elaborate international institutions. The
concept of "international" in international economic law thus
stands in need of some expansion and unpacking - and more of
both than is accomplished by a simple extension of the term to
cover national laws governing foreign economic relations.
Once again, examples from trade and investment relations
involving the U.S. and China give a sense, and are some of the
most significant cases, of a shift that has occurred globally.
China's reopening to the outside world began in earnest with the
authorization of local legal regimes for foreign investment in four
Special Economic Zones (SEZ) on the southeast coast. The de
jure, and even greater de facto, ceding of foreign economic
regulatory power to provincial and local government has reached
the point where much of what matters is now decided locally
(within broad parameters that the central government has
mandated or, sometimes, been resigned to accept).2 This pattern
will become even more striking and complex when Hong Kong
becomes a P.R.C. Special Administrative Region, with its own
quasi-constitution, its independent memberships in key interna-
tional economic organizations, and its profoundly unsocialist legal
and economic order (to be retained for at least fifty years, the
P.R.C. has promised).' The fragmentation of foreign economic
21 See China Laws for Foreign Business - Special Zones and Cities, supra
note 7 (collecting local laws and regulations governing foreign investment, most
dating from the later 1980s and 1990s); see a so NICHOLAS R. LARDY, FOREIGN
TRADE AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA 3841 (1992) (describing decen-
tralization of foreign trade authority); LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, supra note
11, at 349-50, 389-90 (describing autonomy of provincial authorities and local
units in handling foreign investment relations).
' See generally THE BASIC LAW AND HONG KONG'S FUTURE (Peter Wes-
ley-Smith & Albert H.Y. Chen eds., 1988); KEVIN P. LANE, SOVEREIGNTY
AND THE STATUS QUO: THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CHINA'S HONG KONG
POLICY 111-36 (1990).
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regulatory authority has been occurring along non-geographic
lines as well, with a variety of central government ministries and
commissions exercising their rule-making and law-interpreting
powers to structure the environments for trade and investment
that face the enterprises subject to their control or supervision.3
On the U.S. side, some more muted versions of the same patterns
can be seen in the room for divergent "China policies" to be
pressed by various federal government departments, and in the
space that federalism has left for state government initiatives to
promote trade and investment with China, as with other foreign
nations.2 4
In addition, the Chinese state enterprises that have plunged
whole-heartedly into the sea of international commerce contrast
significantly with traditional transnational corporations, as well as
with conventional policy-making and regulatory organs of
government. Their limited and uncertain ownership rights, and
their complex and evolving relationships with the state,t2 are
21 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa [Constitution of the P.R.C.]
art. 90 (1982) (authorizing ministries and commissions under the State Council
to issue regulations, directives, and orders within their substantive jurisdictions);
see, e.g., Duiwai Jingji Maoyi Bu Guanyu Waishang Touzi Qiye Goumai
Guonei Chanpin Chukou Jiejue Waihui Shouzhi Hengde Banfa [Ministry of
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Measures for Foreign Investment
Enterprises Purchasing Domestic Products for Export to Achieve a Balance of
Foreign Exchange Income and Expenditure]; Zhongguo Yinhang Banli
Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Huokuan Zanxin Banfa [Provisional Measures
of the Bank of China for Providing Loans to Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures];
see generally KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLU-
TION THROUGH REFORM 194-205 (1995) (describing functionally differentiated
xitong that define the principal vertical cleavages in China's Party-state);
LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, supra note 11, at 113-20 (discussing roles of the
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, now called the Ministry
of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation); KENNETH G. LIEBERTHAL,
Introduction: The "Fragmented Authoritarianism" Model and Its Limitations, in
BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA 1,
8-10 (Kenneth G. Lieberthal & David M. Lampton eds., 1992).
24 See, e.g., David M. Lampton, America's China Policy in the Age of the
Finance Minister: Clinton Ends Linkage, 139 CHINA Q. 597, 616-17 (1994);
David Nyhan, Region's Future Lies in Export, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 8, 1995, at
23 (describing Massachusetts state government and private business joint
initiative to promote local exports to China); Scot Lehigh, Weld Offers Factory
Incentive, but Hyundai Stalls, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 4, 1991, at 18 (describing
state tax incentives offered to Asian companies to establish manufacturing
plants in Massachusetts).
See generally Donald C. Clarke, Regulation and Its Discontents:
Understanding Economic Law in China, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 383 (1992);
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among the traits that mark them as a different sort of actor whose
presence in the international economy reflects and requires a more
complex set of legal rules.
At the supra-national level, regional institutions, organizations,
and fora are part of a growing variety of actors distinct from, and
suspended between, individual nation-states and GATT-like or
UN-based universal regimes. Of particular significance for China,
the U.S., and U.S.-China ties - as well as good examples of a
ubiquitous trend - are the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations ("ASEAN") and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
("APEC") summits. 6 Counting among its prime concerns the
maintenance of access to U.S. markets and the need to respond to
China's rise as a regional economic power, ASEAN constitutes a
reasonably effective mechanism for coordinating its member
governments' policies and for pursuing concerted action in fields
affecting international economic and legal-economic relations, and
it may ultimately provide the basis for a free trade area with
attendant NAFTA-like, or even European Union-like, multilateral
institutional structures. The looser APEC grouping, which
pursues legal and policy reforms conducive to a more open
regional economic order including the United States and China,
represents yet another form of participation - and perhaps an
embryonic participant - in the construction of a richly layered
and densely nested international economic legal order.
A fifth and final lesson is the most cautionary: discontent
Howard Chao & Yang Xiaoping, The Reform of the Chinese System of Enterprise
Ownership, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 365 (1987); James V. Feinerman, The Evolving
Chinese Enterprise, 15 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 203 (1989); Peng Xiaohua,
Characteristics of China's First Bankruptcy Law, 28 HARv. INT'L L.J. 373 (1987);
Ta-kuang Chang, The Making of the Chinese Bankruptcy Law: A Study in the
Chinese Legislative Process, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333 (1987); Xinbian Gongsifa
Jiaocheng [Newly Complied Teaching Materials on Company Law] 24-52 Giang
Ping ed., 1994); Zhongguo Qiyefa Gailun [Outline of China's Enterprise Law]
43-76 (Wei Mansi et al. eds, 1990).
6 See generally Rodney Tasker et al., Growing Pains, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
July 28, 1994, at 22 (describing ASEAN's growing focus on security issues and
the threats posed by China); Adam Schwarz, Bigger is Better, FAR E. ECON.
REV., July 28, 1994, at 24 (describing ASEAN's plans for increasing group's
leverage in future negotiations to liberalize world trade regime); Sebastian
Moffett, The Devil's in the Details, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 30, 1995, at 14
(reporting on APEC's gradual move toward regional free trade order); Susumu
Awanohara & Nayan Chandha, Uncommon Bonds, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov.
18, 1993, at 16 (describing 1993 APEC summit meeting, including discussion of
trade liberalization goals).
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with some of the consequences of international economic
integration has given rise to a limited reaction, and a persisting
threat of a stronger backlash, that is inimical to a large, expanding
realm for international economic law. As substantial portions
and vital sectors of national economies have become dependent
upon, and vulnerable to, international economic forces, and as
thickening international economic ties have made a wide range of
sometimes-troubling foreign events seem closer to home, the terms
of engagement with the international economy have emerged as
- and merged with - major issues in domestic politics and law-
making. The principal manifestations are Janus-faced, seemingly
paradoxical, phenomena: a renascent economic nationalism that
is marked by protectionism or a modern-day mercantilism, and a
sort of evangelical internationalism that conditions one nation's
economic engagement on its partners' living up to a variety of
non-economic standards of good behavior.
In these areas as well, patterns discernible in many bilateral
and multilateral relationships are particularly evident in the issues
that have roiled trade and investment relations between China and
the United States. On the Chinese side, the reform-era leadership
has been entranced with the successes its East Asian neighbors
have achieved through reliance on "developmental states" that
pursue aggressive national industrial policies. In recent years,
the P.R.C. has used prospective purchases of goods from U.S.
suppliers in a carrot-and-stick strategy to wring from Washington
continued MFN privileges -or other favorable treatment under
U.S. laws. At the same time, the economic face of a resurgent
27 For a fuller discussion of some of the non-economic aspects of this
argument, see Jacques deLisle, Disquiet on the Eastern Front.: Liberal Agendas,
Domestic Legal Orders, and the Role of International Law After the Cold War and
Amid Resurgent Cultural Indentities, 18 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1725 (1995).
28 On other East Asian states' industrial policies, see CHALMERS JOHNSON,
MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRAcLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY,
1925-75 (1982); STEPHAN HAGGARD, PATHWAYS FROM THE PERIPHERY: THE
POLIcs OF GROWTH IN THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES (1990).
On the reform-era Chinese leadership's reaction and response, see, e.g.,
GORDON WHITE, RIDING THE TIGER: THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC REFORM
IN POST-MAO CHINA 35 (1993).
29 See, e.g., Calvin Sims, China Steps Up Spending To Keep U.S. Trade Status,
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1993, at Al (reporting on series of major Chinese
purchases of U.S. goods on eve of U.S. cecision on whether to extend China's
MFN privileges); Craig R. Whitney, China Awards Huge Jet Order to Europeans,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1996, at Al (describing Chinese order of jets from
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Chinese nationalism has sharpened domestic hostility to laws that
confer special privileges on foreigners, including a series of SEZ
tax breaks that are now slated for rescission.3" These objections
have become intertwined with longer-standing worries, and
occasional calls for corrective action, focusing on the central
government's declining abilities to make its writs run amid the
increases in provincial and local government autonomy and the
rapid spread of corruption that has been especially serious in the
regions most tightly tied to the outside world.31 More diffusely,
in the decade and a half since the impact of the new "open door"
policies began to be felt in China, distress at the resulting erosion
of political control and "pollution" by "Western" values has been
a recurring refrain and has provided a potent issue for elements
within the Chinese leadership that would contain or roll back
entanglements with the capitalist world.32 Such moralism has
had its more aggressively outward-looking face, shown in a series
of scathing official denunciations of U.S. criticisms as the
hegemonic and sovereignty-undermining pretensions of a foreign
power lacking the moral standing to judge China's behavior, and
European manufacturer as part of "carrot and stick" strategy used to pressure
Clinton administration not to impose trade sanctions on China); Robert
Hurtado, With Sanctions Set, Companies Rethink Their China Plans, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 1995, at Al (quoting Boeing official's statement that no new orders
from China were to be expected in wake of U.S. determination to impose trade
sanctions on China).
" See, e.g., China SEZs To Lose Import Tax Breaks within Five Years,
REUTERS, Mar. 22, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, China File; Seth
Faison, Outlook '96: The Economy - Why China is Ready to Cool Off, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 2, 1996, at C9 (noting foreign investor reaction to announcement
of end of tax breaks); Benjamin Kang Lim, China Says Policy on Special Econ
Zones Unchanged, REUTERS, Apr. 5, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
China File (quoting Premier Li Peng's statement that cancellation of some tax
breaks was "inevitable").
v See Potter, supra note 8, at 180-84 (discussing the problems of localism
and corruption following in the wake of decentralization and local integration
with the outside world); Alison W. Connor, Anticorruption Legislation: Will
More and Better Rules Curb Widespread Corruption?, E. ASIAN EXECuTIvE REP.,
Jan. 15, 1989, at 8 (describing forms of corruption and legal measures to combat
it).-
32 See, ~. ORVILL SCHELL, To GET RICH is GLORIOUS: CHNA IN TH-E
80's 170-82e (1984) and PEARSON, sup ra note 8, at 120.25 (both discussing the
19 83-84 "Campaign Against Spiritual Pollution" and broader concern with, and
proposed responses to, cultural and ideological impact of influx of Western
ideas and fashions accompanying reform-era policiles of welcoming foreign
investment).
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potentially undeserving of the access to China that it has hereto-
fore enjoyed.33
On the U.S. side, cabinet member-led road shows to promote
the sale of U.S. goods to China reflect a greatly-diluted form of
the interventionist and developmentalist impulse that has spurred
the embrace of government industrial policy elsewhere. There
may be more than just a little economic nationalist sentiment -
and not just a muscular defense of "fair trade" principles - behind
U.S. threats to deny MFN privileges, impose sanctions, or oppose
China's bid to join the WTO in the face of China's huge bilateral
trade surpluses, extensive piracy of intellectual property, use of
low-paid prison labor in export industries, and various other
transgressions. 34  The U.S. demand that China satisfy non-
33 See, e.g., Trade Dispute: US Demands are "Flagrant Intervention" in
China's Internal Affairs, BBC-SWB, Jan. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, China File (denouncin& U.S. demands that China revise its intellectualoperty laws as a violation of international law principles of sovereignty and
as uemanding standards that the U.S. could not meet, and threatening trade
sanctions in retaliation); Chinese Premier Speaks on Human Rights Issue, XINHUA
GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 31, 1992, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, China File (quoting Premier Li Peng's speech at United Nations,
stating China "is opposed to interference in the internal affairs of other
countries using the human rights issue as an excuse"); Steve Holland, Bush, Li
Peng Clash on Human Rights, REUTERS, Jan. 31, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, China File (describing Li Peng UN , speech as "a clear signal of
rejection" of U.S. criticism of Chinese government s human rights record); see
also Seth Faison, Beijing Sees Plot to Thwart China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1995,
at A2 (discussing general view among some Chinese leaders that U.S. is plotting
to contain China politically and frustrate China economically).
14 See, e.g., Patrick E. Tyler, Ron Brown in China: Trade Gets an Open
Door, Human Rights the Closet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1994, § 4, at 2 (reporting
on mission by Commerce Secretary Brown and American business executives
to promote signing of agreements between U.S. firms and Chinese); Patrick E.
Tyler, China Trip Ends with Signing of Energy Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1995,
1, at 39 (reporting on similar mission led by Energy Secretary Hazel
O'Leary); David E. Sanger, How Washington Inc. Makes a Sale, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 1995, § 3, at 1 (describing such missions as part of broader U.S. policy
of promoting opportunities for American business); David E. Sanger & Steven
Erlanger, U.S. Warns China Over Violations of Trade Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
4, 1996, S 1, at 1 (describing impact of intellectual property piracy on U.S.
economy as "potent" political issue driving threat of sanctions); On the Brink,
FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 16, 1995, at 54 noting that U.S. Trade Representa-
tive Mickey Kantor paid careful attention to net impact on U.S. businesses in
crafting threatened trade sanctions against China for intellectual property
piracy); Florence Chong, Australia: Interview with Ira Wolf - U.S. Trade
Official, Bus. TIMES (SINGAPORE), May 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Li-
brary, China File (Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan and China
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economic criteria as a condition of expanding and deepening
economic ties with the United States has been even more visible
and dramatic, most notably in the controversial linkage of China's
enjoyment of MFN trading status to its human rights record, and
in the protracted debate about "delinkage" and substitutes for the
abandoned policy."
These lessons collectively teach that the battering down of
Chinese walls is only one of several defining features of contempo-
rary international economic law. Indeed, it is one of the simplest
and the most preliminary aspects, although one that has been
more complicated and protracted than many have imagined.
Much of what defines the scope, shapes the character, and
establishes the importance of international economic law lies in
other, more complex facets of the field. It lies in the rules for
issuing and obtaining the "building permits" for constructing
transnational economic relationships - and precluding the
reconstruction of Chinese walls - in the space that the battering
rams have cleared. As the analogy to building permits reminds us,
the process can sometimes work smoothly and predictably, but it
can also be byzantine, replete with hidden traps and slippery rules,
describing China's export of prison labor-produced goods as a rights issue
relevant to China's MFN status and for the WTO, and pledging U.S. "will use
our government to open [foreign] markets" to allow in U.S. goods that are
competitive under conditions of fair trade and competition); Jean-Luc Forgeron,
China: Slaves of China Who Make the Cup that Cheers the West, OBSERVER, Oct.
30, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, China File (describing exports of
Chinese prison labor-produced goods as "amount[ing] to dumping, as tey are
so cheap"); Susumu Awanohara, The K-Street Crowd, FAR E. ECON. REV., June
2, 1994, at 25 (noting opposition to extension of MFN for China expressed by
representative of AFL-CIO labor union).
31 See Exec. Order No. 12,850, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,327 (1993) (conditioning
extension of China's MFN status beyond June 1994 on China's compliance
with bilateral agreement on prison labor and on "overall, significant progress"
in five human rights areas); Presidential Determination No. 94-26, 59 Fed. Reg.
31,103 (1994) (extending China's MFN status for an additional year, without
reference to human rights conditions); Presidential Determination No. 95-23,
60 Fed. Reg. 31,047 (1995) (similar); Lampton, supra note 24 (analyzing Clinton
Administration decision to "de-link"); BEYOND MFN: TRADE wrH CHNA
AND AMERiCAN INTERESTS Games R. Lilley & Wendell L. Willkie II eds.,
1994) (discussing several aspects of trade-human rights linkage); Diane F.
Orentlicher & Timothy A. Gelatt, Public Law, Private Actors: The Impact of
Human Rights on Business Investors in China, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 66
(1993) (assessing private corporate policies and proposed code of conduct
legislation establishing human rights standards for U.S. companies doing
business with and in China).
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and can even invite a fair amount of lawlessness and corruption.
The foregoing lessons thus point to possible frustrations for many
participants in the activities that are or might be governed by
international economic law. They also point, however, to a
fruitful and important agenda for scholars and analysts of this
vast, vital, varied, and evolving field.
In stressing the new prominence of international economic law
in international affairs, economic relations, and law, and the
growing complexity of international economic law, this essay has
sought to underscore, with examples drawn from the U.S.-China
case, what ought to be obvious. In suggesting what kinds of issues
are shaping the on-going and uncertain transformation of
international economic law, this essay has attempted to identify
some of the important questions, albeit ones that may still be
unanswerable even with respect to the relatively narrow field of
the Sino-U.S. interactions that have provided the principal
examples here. The first of these undertakings may be appropri-
ate, and certainly is customary, on the occasion of the inaugural
issues of a journal devoted to the field. That this journal is among
a very few that have explicitly adopted this focus also suggests that
the seemingly obvious may well warrant some berating. The far
more important endeavor is to extend this essay's second project,
and to pursue answers to the possibly unanswerable, still-unan-
swered, and too often unasked questions about the legal regulation
of economic dealings that cross political borders. That is a task
for those who will use the pages of this and future issues of this
journal to advance our understanding of the developments and
difficulties that shape international economic law.
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